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Contribution Between Parties to a Discriminatory Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes persons in-
jured by a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement to sue the 
responsible employer or union for back pay. 1 Title VII's back pay 
relief serves two purposes: it compensates the victims of discrimina-
tion and deters discriminatory practices.2 The Supreme Court re-
cently agreed to consider whether an employer sued for back pay can 
seek contribution3 from a union that "participated in" a collective 
bargaining agreement containing a discriminatory term.4 To decide 
this issue, the Court will have to consider the effect of contribution 
on title VII's compensatory and deterrent purposes. 
Courts and scholars have often failed to distinguish rules_ of lia-
bility under title VII from rules for the apportionment of a back pay 
judgment. Rules of liability determine whom an injured employee 
can sue for back pay; rules of apportionment, including rules of con-
tribution and indemnification, determine whom a defendant can 
force to contribute to a judgment in favor of an injured plaintiff. 5 
Because joint and several liability is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for contribution among parties who are liable to the plain-
tiff, it is necessary to identify the nature of union and employer lia-
bility for title VII back pay before considering rights to contribution. 
This Note examines rules of title VII back pay liability and ap-
portionment. 6 Part I argues that all signatories to a discriminatory 
I. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, e-1 to e-17 (1976). 
2. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). 
3. Contribution enables a joint tortfeasor who has been sued by a victim to force other 
wrongdoers to contribute to the victim's judgment. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS§ 50 (4th ed. 1971). 
4. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980) (employer seeks contribution from union for 
back pay judgment under title VII and Equal Pay Act). 
5. The term "apportionment" as used here denotes a determination of a defendant's liabil-
ity to other violators rather than to the plaintiff. The term has another meaning in certain tort 
cases. When two or more defendants cause separately measurable harms to the plaintiff, one 
breaking the plaintiff's leg and the other breaking his arm, for example, the court will find 
each defendant liable for only the injury he himself caused. This determination of each de-
fendant's separate liability to the plaintiff is also called "apportionment." See W. PROSSER, 
supra note 3, at § 52. In this Note, however, the term refers only to a determination of one 
defendant's liability to another. 
6. This Note does not address the question whether employers who violate the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963 have a cause of action for contribution against unions that participate in or cause 
that violation. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d 
1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct 3008 (1980), the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on this question along with the question of contribution in title VII cases. Although both 
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collective bargaining agreement should be jointly and severally lia-
ble to injured persons for back pay. Although a union or employer 
may object to joint and several liability if its opponent in collective 
bargaining proposed and bargained for the discriminatory term, the 
purposes of title VII require that the parties become jointly and sev-
erally liable upon signing the agreement. Since joint and several lia-
bility fully serves the compensatory purpose of the statute, Part II of 
the Note looks to deterrence alone in selecting appropriate rules of 
apportionment. Part II concludes that when a plaintiff sues only one 
questions concern contribution in employment discrimination cases, the differences between 
the Equal Pay Act and title VII raise issues beyond the scope of this Note. 
The most prominent difference is that title VII gives to aggrieved employees a cause of 
action directly against the union for violations of the statute, see § 706(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e• 
5(f) (1976), while the Equal Pay Act does not. Although the Equal Pay Act bars both employ-
ers and unions from discriminating or causing wage discrimination on the basis of sex, see 29 
U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(l) & (2) (1976), it provides _for suits by aggrieved employees only against 
employers, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. 1977). However, the Act does empower the 
government to recover monetary damages from unions violating the Act and to distribute the 
funds to the affected employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 206(d)(3) (1976 & Supp. 1977); Re• 
organization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 1, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978) (transferring Equal Pay Act 
enforcement from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion); Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), ajfd. per curiam sub nom. 
Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd., 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972). 
The lack of a direct action by employees against unions under the Equal Pay Act has led 
some courts to find that the employer has no right of contribution against the union for Equal 
Pay Act liability. "[A]n essential prerequisite to contribution, where a right to contribution is 
recognized, is common liability. Since labor organizations and employers do not share com-
mon liability to employees under the Equal Pay Act, there can be no contribution, which is not 
true with Title VII." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 14 
Emp. Prac. Dec.~ 7730, at 5597 (D.D.C. 1977), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). See Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 
889 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Proponents of contribution respond in two ways. First, they argue that the union is jointly 
liable with employers for conduct violating the Equal Pay Act. Joint liability arguably arises 
because the union is liable in suits brought by the government, see Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 
326 F. Supp. 371 (D. Md. 1971), ajfd. per curiam sub nom. Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional 
Joint Bd., 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Dunlop v. Beloit College, 411 F. Supp. 398, 
402 (W. D. Wis. 1976), and because the legislative history supports an implied cause of action 
for damages by aggrieved employees against the union, see Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 
(1980). Second, they argue that contribution is appropriate where the union is liable under 
other doctrines of federal law for the same conduct that violates the Equal Pay Act, see gener• 
ally Fischbach & Moore Intl. Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 476 F. Supp. 282,287 (D. Md. 1979), 
and that any conduct violating the Equal Pay Act will also violate title VII, see § 703(h), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). 
Opponents of contribution argue that the Equal Pay Act and title VII serve different poli• 
cies and that contribution will undermine the policy of the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act 
(which is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act) is intended in part to prevent employers from 
gaining unfair advantages over competitors by paying discriminatory wages. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 202(a)(3) (1976). ''To allow the employer to recover, by virtue of an implied cause of action 
under the Act, a portion of this back pay from a labor organization would place the discrimi-
nating employer in an unfairly advantageous position vis-a-vis employers who comply with 
the Act .... " Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 14 Emp. 
Prac. Dec. ~ 7730, at 5593 (D.D.C. 1977), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C, Cir, 
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980); see Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 440 F. 
Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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party to a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, the de-
fendant should be able to require other parties to the agreement to 
contribute to any back pay judgment, except when requiring an em-
ployer to pay the entire judgment will best deter the formation of 
discriminatory contracts. 
I. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THE COMPENSATORY 
PURPOSE OF TITLE VII 
Title VII should be interpreted as imposing joint and several lia-
bility on the parties to a discriminatory collective bargaining agree-
ment. Title VII forbids discrimination by employers and unions, 
and prohibits unions from causing or attempting to cause an em-
ployer to discriminate along racial, sexual, ethnic, or religious lines. 7 
Individual victims may sue discriminating unions and employers in 
federal district court. 8 The statute authorizes courts not only to en-
join employer and union discrimination, but also to impose back pay 
liability.9 The legislative history reveals that Congress intended 
these provisions to combat contractual discrimination by imposing 
back pay liability on both unions and employers.10 
7. Section 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976), provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise discriminate against, any 
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segre-
gate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or 
refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his sta-
tus as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. 
8. Section 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976), allows aggrieved persons to bring a civil 
suit once they have exhausted Equal Employment Opportunity Commission remedies. 
9. Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), provides in pertinent part: 
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court 
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited 
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the 
unlawful employment practice) or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing 
of a charge with the Commission. 
10. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7206-07 (1964) (Department of Justice statement in remarks 
of Sen. Clark), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, at 3244 (1968). ("[T]itle VII would have no effect on the duties of any employer 
or labor organization under the NLRA or under the Railway Labor Act, and these duties 
would continue to be enforced as they are now. On the other hand, where the procedures of 
Title VII are invoked, the remedies available are . . . injunctive relief against continued dis-
crimination, plus appropriate affirmative action including the payment of backpay"); HousE 
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1962, H.R. 
No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1962); HEARINGS ON CIVIL RIGHTS BEFORE SUBCOMM. 
No. 5 OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1944 (1963) (statement of Wal-
ter Reuther). 
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To observe that unions and employers are simultaneously liable 
for discriminatory collective bargaining agreements, however, does 
not establish that a plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his 
injury from either party.11 Some courts, while holding both unions 
and employers liable, fail to specify whether they are imposing joint 
and several liability. 12 Other courts have spoken of dividing liability 
in various manners between union and employer, implying, perhaps, 
that collection of the entire judgment from one party would not be 
allowed.13 
Although only a few cases directly confront the question of 
whether unions and employers are jointly and severally liable, 14 the 
Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 15 sup-
ports an affirmative conclusion. The Court in Albemarle held that 
both employer and union should be liable for back pay except "for 
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central 
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the 
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination." 16 Lower courts' general recognition of some 
11. C.f. Note, Union Liability for Employer .Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1980) 
(arguing for union liability in all cases of contractually caused discrimination, but not differen-
tiating among joint and several liability, apportioned liability, and liability for contribution). 
12. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). 
13. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 353 (5th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977); Myers v. 
Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 849-50 (5th Cir.), mod!fted, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1060 
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 
1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (court remands to district court for explanation of why district court im-
posed half the court costs on employer, half on union, but awarded total amount of back pay 
against employer), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Ford v. United States Steel 
Corp., 17 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 940 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (attorneys' fees division); Stevenson v. 
International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1977); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,400 
F. Supp. 993, 996-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reducing title VII attorneys' fee award against union 
from $128,000 to $50,000 in light of union's limited ability to pay and its nonprofit-making 
status), ajfd sub nom. EEOC v. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 2 Emp. Prac. Dec. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1970), 
revd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971) (attorneys' fee division). 
These declarations of simultaneous liability are ambiguous, however, because they do not 
preclude the possibility of a plaintiff recovering all his damages from one defendant. The 
decisions leave unclear whether, on the one hand, the declaration of equal 50% shares of liabil• 
ity, for instance, would preclude a plaintiff from collecting more than 50% from one of the 
parties, or whether, on the other hand, the even division presents a formula for final shares 
after contribution. 
14. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum); 
Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Fla. 1977). 
15. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court in Albemarle did not have to reach the question of 
joint union-employer liability because the district court had refused to hold either union or 
employer liable for back pay. No issue of union liability relative to the employer was 
presented. 
16. 422 U.S. at 421. 
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form of union liability for back pay is consistent with the Albemarle 
requirement that back pay be awarded so as to deter discrimina-
tion.17 It is the statute's compensatory policy, however, that requires 
joint and several liability.18 If unions and employers were not jointly 
and severally liable for contractual discrimination, the inability of 
one party to pay would make it impossible for a victim of discrimi-
nation to recover the full amount of his damages. Without joint and 
several liability, many victims of discrimination would not be made 
whole. A rule of joint and several liability would allow an injured 
person to sue a solvent party for all his damages. 
Signatories of a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement 
should therefore be jointly and severally liable for back pay under 
title VII. Once a rule of joint and several liability is established, the 
problem of apportionment of back pay judgments among violators 
immediately arises. 19 
II. APPORTIONMENT OF A BACK PAY JUDGMENT 
A. The Case for Contribution 
If courts hold unions and employers jointly and severally liable 
for signing a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, an in-
jured person can choose any or all of the signatories as defendants in 
a title VII suit. If a union or employer singled out for suit is denied 
contribution, it alone must pay the entire back pay award. Employ-
ees and other victims almost invariably sue either the employer 
alone,20 or both the employer and the union.21 Often the union itself 
17. See text at notes 70-79 infra. 
18. Some courts have recognized that unions and employers are jointly and severally liable 
for back pay. E.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(under title VII, "the union and the employer may be held jointly liable when the unlawful 
activity was a joint undertaking"); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 
1389 (5th Cir. 1978) ("A union is jointly liable with the employer for discrimination caused in 
whole or in part by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement"); Myers v. Gilman 
Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 848-49 (5th Cir.), modified, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D. 
Fla. 1977). None of these cases expressly claims to impose joint liability because of title VIl's 
compensatory purpose. 
19. C.f. Winfield v. St. Joe Paper Co., 15 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1497, 1500 (N.D. Fla. 1977) 
("(T]he company and the labor unions are 'correctly viewed ... as joint wrongdoers whose 
concurrent acts caused plaintiffs' injuries .•• .' The disposition of the case is bifurcated, with 
the initial proceeding limited to a determination of the liability, if any, of the defendants. If 
joint liability is found, the second phase is for the purpose of apportioning liability among the 
defendants") (citation omitted). 
20. See, e.g., Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977); Laffey v. North-
west Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
21. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Myers v. 
Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modified, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Osborne v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 276, 4 Emp. Prac. 
Dec. ~ 7757 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
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sues the employer as the representative of a class of injured employ-
ees. 22 Thus a rule allowing contribution would most often benefit 
employers at the expense of unions. 
Contribution claims arise in different ways, depending upon who 
is suing and who is being sued. If an employee sues the union or 
employer alone, the defendant may file a third-party claim before 
trial for contribution against other parties to the agreement, or may 
commence a separate suit for contribution after judgment.23 If a 
union represents the plaintiff class of employees, the employer may 
file a counterclaim for contribution.24 Finally, if both union and em-
ployer are sued, each may file a cross-claim against the other for 
contribution or indemnifi.cation25 in the event it is found liable at 
trial.26 
Title VII is silent regarding contribution claims by parties jointly 
and severally liable for back pay.27 Partly as a result of this silence, 
title VII contribution claims have had a mixed reception in the 
courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed contribu-
tion claims by parties who settle before trial.28 The Fifth Circuit has 
permitted contribution, but apparently requires that a party be guilty 
of some degree of involvement in discrimination beyond the mere 
signing of the agreement before it will be forced to contribute.29 The 
District of Columbia Circuit has declined to decide the issue, saying 
it is "a complex and sensitive question."30 No district court has up-
held a motion to dismiss a title VII contribution claim as a matter of 
22. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 
F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970). 
23. Northwest Airlines attempted to obtain contribution by both of these procedures in the 
litigation now before the Supreme Court. A federal district court dismissal of a third-party 
claim for contribution from the Transport Workers Union was upheld by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 476-78 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The company also co=enced a separate 
suit for contribution. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 
606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). 
24. See cases cited at note 22 supra. 
25. Indemnification shifts the entire loss from one joint tortfeasor to another who is 
deemed responsible for making the full payment. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330,331 
(7th Cir. 1979). 
26. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Osborne 
v. McCall Printing Co., 4 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 276, 4 Emp. Prac. Dec. ~ 7757 (S.D. Ohio 
1972). 
27. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1980). 
28. Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Denicola v. G.C. 
Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977). 
29. Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modffied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
30. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 606 F.2d 13S0, 13S6 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). 
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law,31 but some have expressed serious doubts as to whether contri-
bution claims will succeed.32 The standard governing when contri-
bution will be allowed therefore remains unclear. Since contribution 
does not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover back pay,33 courts 
should look to title VII's deterrent purpose to decide: (1) whether 
contribution is appropriate; and (2) when it is appropriate, how con-
tribution shares should be determined.34 
When the Supreme Court in A!bemar/e35 endorsed the Eighth 
Circuit's36 conclusion that the "reasonably certain prospect of a back 
pay award"37 would provide ''the spur or catalyst which causes em-
ployers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate"38 discriminatory 
practices, it did not explicitly address the question of joint and sev-
eral liability for discriminatory collective bargaining agreements, 
and it therefore failed to reach the issue of contribution. Allowing a 
right of contribution between union and employer, however, wquld 
increase the effectiveness of the "spur or catalyst" of back pay at the 
bargaining table. 
One theoretical view of the bargaining process suggests that the 
presence or absence of contribution would not affect the level of de-
terrence. Such a view would assume that, given any particular allo-
cation of liability, either party (union or employer) during 
bargaining would trade away a valuable benefit to achieve a discrim-
inatory contract so long as the utility to that party of the discrimina-
31. For denials of motions to dismiss title VII contribution claims, see, e.g., Lynch v. 
Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 
(E.D. Va. 1973); Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 49 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ga. 1970). 
32. See, e.g., Blanton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 49 F.R.D. 162, 164 (N.D. Ga. 1970). 
33. See text at notes 14-19 supra. 
34. Some co=entators have ignored the need to preserve the deterrent effects of back pay 
liability. See, e.g., Youngdahl, Suggestions far Labor Unions Faced with Liability under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 ARK. L. REV. 631 (1973) (discussed infra); Co=ent, 
The Union as Title VII Plaintiff Affirmative Obligation to Litigate?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1388, 
1412 (1978) (apparently assuming that the only deterrent effect of back pay would be to force 
unions to sue in court). One early co=entator suggested that back pay liability for discrimi-
natory contracts should not be imposed on unions, because "[t]he employer is the 'paymaster.' 
[The employer] would have paid the discriminatees what they would have received had it not 
been for discrimination in the past. It cannot be permitted now to pass on any of that obliga-
tion merely because it has been deferred." Youngdahl, supra at 646. This same commentator 
also suggested that money damages are more properly paid by the employer than by the union 
because the employees represented by the union will have to pay the cost of being displaced by 
the past victims of discrimination, while the employer will not suffer such displacement. Id. at 
648. However, the employer-as-sole-paymaster argument begins with an unsound premise: 
the employer will not be the sole paymaster if the union abuses the bargaining process so as to 
achieve a discriminatory shifting of benefits from a disfavored to a favored class of employees. 
35. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
36. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973). 
37. 422 U.S.,at 417. 
38. 422 U.S. at 417-18, quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th 
Cir. 1973). 
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tory provision exceeded the potential back pay liability. Similarly, 
either party would trade away a valuable benefit to get rid of a dis-
criminatory term if the potential liability for the term exceeded its 
utility. For example, if an employer believed that by discriminating 
it could improve its profitability by an amount greater than its poten-
tial liability for back pay, it would be willing to bargain away other 
less valuable terms to keep the discriminatory term. Conversely, a 
union that found no utility in the term itself and that feared back pay 
liability would off er concessions to the employer to get rid of the 
term. If bargaining proceeded ideally, the term would be included in 
the final agreement if and only if the total amount the parties were 
willing to pay to include the term exceeded the amount they would 
pay to keep it out.39 Stated somewhat differently, if the total utility 
of the term to both parties exceeded the potential total back pay lia-
bility, the term would be included; if the potential liability exceeded 
the utility, bargaining would remove the term. Thus, the inclusion 
or exclusion of the discriminatory term would be independent of the 
particular rule of allocation. Any change in the allocation of poten-
tial back pay liability would make one party more eager to include 
the term ( or less eager to exclude it) but would have exactly the op-
posite and offsetting effect on the other party.40 
But in the real world, deterrence is improved by threatening both 
parties with liability. The improved deterrence arises because par-
ties to real world bargaining are not omniscient, and may inaccu-
rately assess the utility and liability that accompany a discriminatory 
term. Imperfect information about potential liability or utility can 
lead to irrational results. For example, the employer may be una-
ware that the contract discriminates, and may remain unaware dur-
ing bargaining, if the union has no incentive to reveal the 
discrimination. The employer may also misperceive the utility of the 
39. If both parties are willing to "pay" - i.e., give up a valuable benefit - to keep the 
term, then it will be included in the agreement. If both are willing to pay to remove the term 
(though it is not likely, then, that it would have been proposed at all), then the term will be 
taken out. If one party wants to keep the term while the other wants to remove it, the party 
willing to pay the most will achieve its desire. 
40. For example, suppose that the employer bears all the liability for back pay. Suppose 
further that the potential liability is $100, the utility to the employer is $50, and the utility to 
the union is $40 (total utility to both parties of $90). A rational employer would offer the 
union $41 in benefits to agree to delete the discriminatory term, and both parties would gain. 
The employer would give up $50 utility plus $41 in benefits but would gain $100 in lost liabil-
ity for a net gain of $9. The union would give up $40 in utility for $41 in benefits for a $1 net 
gain. Now suppose the utility to the employer is $70. He will not give up $111 ($70 utility plus 
$41 in benefits to the union) in order to escape liability of only $100. Nor is the result changed 
by making each party liable for half the back pay, or $50 each. The employer now has a $70 
utility and faces $50 potential liability. To give up that $70 utility, the employer will want at 
least $21 from the union; $21 plus $50 lost liabilty minus $70 utility yields a SI net gain. But, 
the union cannot afford to give up that $21 in benefits plus another $40 in utility in order to 
escape a $50 liability. The outcome, then, is the same no matter how the liability is appor-
tioned. 
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discriminatory term to the union and thus may not even attempt to 
bargain for its removal. Requiring both parties to bargain against 
discriminatory contracts will improve deterrence by increasing the 
flow of information between the parties. For this reason, both par-
ties should be encouraged by the threat of liability to bargain against 
discriminatory contracts.41 
Thus far, this argument establishes only that both the union and 
the employer should be threatened by liability, not that contribution 
should be available. If joint and several liability were the rule, and if 
plaintiffs were just as likely to sue unions as to sue employers, then 
both parties would be equally threatened by liability whether or not 
contribution were allowed. But the cases reported suggest that vic-
tims of discrimination will sue unions much less often than they will 
sue employers.42 Such a pattern would reduce the threat of back pay 
liability to unions under a no-contribution rule. The only way to 
ensure a balance of threats against union and employer is to allow 
contribution. 
Concern for fairness offers additional support for a rule allowing 
contribution in title VII back pay litigation. Denying contribution 
seems unfair because it "places the full burden of restitution upon 
one who is only in part responsible for a plaintiffs loss."43 As the 
Supreme Court recently observed, contribution promotes "a more 
'equal distribution of justice' . . . by ameliorating the common-law 
rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two 
violators to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been 
equally or more to blame."44 Partly out of concern for fairness, fed-
eral courts have extended contribution rights in securities,45 anti-
trust, 46 and admiralty47 cases. 
Four possible arguments against contribution in title VII back 
pay suits seem unpersuasive after close examination. One objection 
is that courts have traditionally allowed contribution only between 
unintentional tortfeasors,48 while only "intentional" violators are lia-
41. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). 
42. See text at notes 20-22 supra. 
43. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1968). 
44. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974). 
45. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). 
46. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 
(8th Cir. 1979). But see Olson Farms Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 
(10th Cir.), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec, 27, 1979); Wilson P. Abra-
ham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 
U.S.L.W. 3321 (1980) (No. 79-1144). 
41. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). 
48. The English common law denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors, see Mer-
ryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), as did the 1955 revision of the 1939 
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act in section l(c). A mistaken interpretation 
of the Merryweather doctrine led most American jurisdictions to deny contribution to both 
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ble for back pay under title VIl.49 This objection fails for two rea-
sons. First, a very low level of intent is sufficient to violate title VII. 
Proof of discriminatory intent is usually unnecessary;50 rather, 
"[i]ntentional unfair employment practices are those engaged in de-
liberately and not accidentally."51 All that the plaintiff ordinarily 
need show is a discriminatory effect to make out a prima facie case.52 
Failure to rebut the prima facie case with evidence of a valid busi-
ness purpose will leave the defendant liable even though its inten-
tions were laudable. 53 Second, the rule barring contribution between 
intentional tortfeasors is neither absolute nor unquestioned. Some 
courts have allowed intentional violators to receive contribution,54 
and several commentators have urged abolition of the rule barring 
contribution to intentional violators. 55 In short, the rule is archaic 
and should not apply to title VII violations: courts should look else-
where for reasons to grant or deny contribution in title VII cases.56 
A second objection to contribution in title VII cases is that it vio-
lates legislative intent. In a recent dissent from a Third Circuit opin-
negligent and intentional tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 50; Leflar, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Between Torrfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932). Until recently, federal 
common law did not provide for contribution between joint tortfeasors. See, e.g. , Halcyon 
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,285 (1952) (contribution denied 
in maritime personal injury cases); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1) Trade Cas. 
72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying contribution to an antitrust defendant); DiBenedetto 
v. United States, (1975-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 87,330, 87,331 (D.R.I. 1974) (denying tax fraud de-
fendant contribution). 
49. Title VII empowers the court to order payment of back pay where it finds that the 
defendant "has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employ-
ment practice .•.. " Section 706(g}, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
50. See Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S, Ct, 
1850 (1980); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Firefighters 
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. 
Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796-97 
(5th Cir.}, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
51. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that 
"discrimination based on reliance on conflicting state statutes is an intentional unfair employ-
ment practice"). 
52. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1058 (1976); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972). 
53. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 14, Intl. Union of Operating Engrs., 415 F. Supp. 1155, 1173 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), ajfd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977), 
54. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 
(1954) (per Brennan, J., now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court) (allowing 
intentional tortfeasor contribution on statutory interpretation grounds}, trial judgment mod!fied 
on remand, 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957). Several cases have granted contribution to inten-
tional violators of the securities laws. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir, 
1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see generally Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1256. 
55. See Leflar, supra note 48, at 145-46; Comment, Contribution and the .Distribution of 
Loss Among Torrfeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 232 (1975); Note, Contribution and Antitrust 
Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 921 (1980). 
56. See text at notes 41-47 supra. 
November 1980] Note - Title VII Contribution 183 
ion approving a title VII contribution award, Judge Sloviter argued 
that Congress intended to deny contribution when it left express con-
tribution provisions out of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.57 Like some 
courts that deny contribution among joint antitrust violators,58 Judge 
Sloviter reasoned that the eighty-eighth Congress was aware that 
federal common law barred contribution, and that it must therefore 
have intended to deny contribution under title VII.59 Judge 
Sloviter's objection should be rejected for several reasons. First, it 
seems more likely that Congress never considered the possibility of 
contribution claims than that it intended to deny them. 60 The statute 
fails clearly to specify that parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment are jointly and severally liable for discriminatory terms,61 
which suggests that Congress was unsure about joint and several lia-
bility, let alone about the apportionment problems that accompany 
it. Second, one can read the back pay provisions of title VII as im-
plicitly endorsing contribution rights.62 Finally, ambiguous legisla-
tive intent seems a poor justification for rejecting a rule that would 
promote the deterrent purpose that lay at the heart of congressional 
resolve to pass the Civil Rights Act. 
A third argument against title VII contribution rights is equally 
unpersuasive. Some have warned that contribution claims will un-
duly complicate title VII suits. 63 Yet contribution in securities suits, 
which commonly involve more defendants than title VII cases, has 
not produced excessive complexity.64 Should a court become seri-
ously concerned that the complexity caused by a contribution claim 
will impose excessive burdens upon a plaintiff, it can sever the con-
tribution claim from the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
42(b).65 
A final argument against contribution is that it will frustrate a 
strong statutory policy favoring pre-trial settlement of title VII dis-
putes. 66 Contribution might in some cases discourage settlement: 
57. Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 99 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J., 
dissenting). 
58. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglow Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 
(N.D. Cal. 1976). But see Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 
897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (1980) (No. 79-1144). 
59. 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 99. 
60. See Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1980). 
61. 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 88. 
62. See text at notes 35-42 supra. 
63. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 100 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
64. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 
1184-85 (8th Cir. 1979) (dictum). 
65. See Note, supra note 55, at 916. 
66. See, e.g., Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn., Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 
573 F.2d 960, 963-64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978) (title VII policy of encourag-
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defendants could not achieve repose by settling, if after settlement 
they still faced potential contribution claims by non-settling viola-
tors. Courts, however, could remove such disincentives to settle by 
barring contribution against settling defendants. 67 Such an excep-
tion to a general rule permitting contribution would have to be ac-
companied by close judicial scrutiny of "bad faith" or "collusive" 
settlements between the plaintiff and one of the parties to the agree-
ment. 68 Even if courts allow contribution claims against settling par-
ties, the disincentive to settle may be outweighed by the pro-
settlement incentive created when courts permit contribution claims 
by settling defendants against joint violators.69 
Having established that contribution will promote deterrence and 
not impede other title VII policies, we must ask which rule for the 
division of shares between union and employer will maximize deter-
rence. The answer comes in part from the preceding analysis: if we 
seek to ensure the greatest possible deterrent effect on both parties, a 
half-and-half division is ordinarily best. Courts could adopt other 
rules, but if the desideratum is "self-examination"70 by both parties 
of the proposed terms of employment, no other rule will so strongly 
promote the exchange of information71 between the parties. 
A half-and-half rule of apportionment is prima facie reasonable 
because courts cannot predict in advance from which side of the bar-
gaining table a discriminatory proposal will come. A half-and-half 
rule would deter discriminatory proposals from both sides equally. 
But some courts might prefer to adjust contribution shares to impose 
heavier burdens on those who propose discriminatory terms or on 
those who seem more likely to benefit from the term's inclusion.72 
ing settlements precludes intervenors from challenging plaintiff-by-plaintiff meri!S of class set-
tlement); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1976) ("the clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements must 
also be taken into account . . . particularly in an area where voluntary compliance by the 
parties over an extended period will contribute significantly toward ultimate achievement of 
statutory goals"); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970) ("In 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress placed great emphasis on private settlement 
and the elimination of unfair practices without resorting to the court's injunctive powers"); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (EEOC conciliation attempt prerequisite to EEOC suit); B. ScHLEI & 
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1127 ()976 & Supp. )979), 
67. Courts have uniformly denied contribution against settling antitrust defendan!S. See, 
e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979). Some courts have 
allowed title VII contribution claims by settling defendants against joint violators. See, e.g. , 
Denicola v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1977). 
68. Court approval of class action settlements is already required under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(e). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 66, at 1127. 
69. See Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1980). 
10. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
11. See text at notes 39-40 supra. 
12. See Note, Union Liability Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEO, L.J. 
959, 984-87 (1980), arguing that the only kind of contractually caused discrimination that 
should automatically lead to the liability of a signatory union is discrimination caused by 
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Such changes, however, would be responsive only to vague and irrel-
evant notions of fairness and to improper notions of causation, 73 and 
seem unlikely to improve deterrence. 
The purpose of a rule of contribution is to encourage parties to 
examine potentially discriminatory contract terms, not to punish the 
culpable. 74 Merely being a proposer or a potential beneficiary of a 
discriminatory term does not make a party more likely to examine 
carefully the discriminatory effect of the term. Contribution shares 
should be apportioned so as to insure that the party most likely to 
respond to the threat of contribution liability by bargaining against 
discrimination will face the largest possible threat. Since we cannot 
predict in advance which party will be the more responsive, an even 
apportionment of contribution shares best achieves this goal. 
It remains to decide what formula for apportionment should be 
used when more than two parties negotiate an agreement. Fre-
quently, both a local union and an international union will be repre-
sented at the bargaining table.75 The principle of even 
apportionment might dictate either that each bargainingparlj' con-
tribute equally to any judgment, or that each side in bargaining (la-
bor and management) contribute equally.76 Apportioning half of the 
judgment to labor and half to management would maximize deter-
rence if, as it seems safe to assume in most cases, the various groups 
on either side will pool their informational resources77 and confront 
the other side as a single entity.78 The two most carefully reasoned 
appellate decisions confronting the question of multiple-party appor-
seniority provisions, because "[m]ost other employment practices described in a labor contract 
are not as likely to be union-inspired, and their inclusion in the contract does not alone lead to 
a presumption that there is a nexus between the discrimination they cause and the union in-
volved." Id at 985. Because the Georgetown Note argues that unions should not be liable 
unless they "cause" discrimination, it is hard to assert confidently that that Note's conclusions 
would apply if the problem were recast as a question of contribution. For a broader definition 
of the word "cause," one closer to this Note's analysis and (it is submitted) the bulk of the case 
law, see Note, supra note 11, at 705. 
13. See generally id 
14. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (back pay should "spur'' self-
examination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) ("good intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent" is not a concern of title VII). 
15. See, e.g., Gius v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fr:_ Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270-71 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 
(1976); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1976). 
16. Compare Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 537 (D. Tex. 1974) (equal one-
third shares for employer, local and international), with Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 
432 F. Supp. 390, 409 (W.D. La. 1977) (one-half share for employer, one-half share for local 
and international). Both these cases impose liabilit,y shares, not contribution shares. 
11. See generally R. FRANCE, UNION DECISIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1955); N. 
CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 258-82 (1951). 
78. Cf. Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 409 (W.D. La. 1977) ("The 
International and Local 582 operate as a single entity as a practical matter. Together they 
constitute one side of the table in collective bargaining sessions. With respect to the back pay 
liability to employees, then, they should be considered together as one joint wrongdoer. Thus, 
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tionment have approved half-and-half apportionment.79 
No title VII policy requires that contribution be barred between 
parties that sign a discriminatory collective bargaining agreement, 
and allowing contribution usually increases deterrence of discrimi-
nation. As a general rule, courts should therefore allow contribution 
among unions and employers jointly liable to workers for back pay. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, barring contribution might better pro-
mote deterrence than allowing it. Section B identifies this category, 
and recommends that district courts deny contribution in such cases. 
B. Limiting the Right to Contribution: A Bargaining-Resistance 
.Defense 
A rule allowing contribution assures that a union or employer 
fortunate enough not to be singled out for a title VII suit will still 
contribute to any back pay award. The prospect of contribution 
should usually increase incentives to bargain against a discrimina-
tory term in a collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, in 
some cases the threat of contribution will do little to deter a party 
from accepting a discriminatory term even if it opposes the term. so 
If one party to collective bargaining decides that the benefits it will 
they should bear one-half the burden, not two-thirds the burden, as if each were a separate 
wrongdoer."). , 
The Stevenson court pronounced the unions liable for 50% of the damages, but suggested, 
following Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), modfjied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), that the unions might be able to get a reduction of 
their "ultimate financial burden" "through the assertion of cross-claims of contribution or in-
demnity between the unions and the company," 432 F. Supp. at 408. This Note suggests that 
the 50% share of union responsibility should be altered only in accordance with the bargain-
ing-resistance defense, see notes 83-96 i'!fra. 
19. See Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 86, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1980); Myers 
v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 849-50 (5th Cir.), modfjied, 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
80. For a cursory approval of a rule of automatic liability for both parties in all cases, see 
Note, supra note 11, at 702-07 (arguing that "[b]oth the language and purpose of Title VII are 
better served when a union is judged by the product of its negotiations rather than by its 
unsuccessful bargaining efforts"). The Harvard Note rests on two arguments. First, a union 
signatory to a discriminatory contract "causes" discrimination in violation of section 703(c)(3); 
mere bargaining resistance does not negate causation. Second, the absolute liability "results" 
rule will more strongly deter the creation of discriminatory contracts. 
The first of these arguments is irrelevant to the question of back pay: a violation of section 
703(c)(3) does not necessarily imply back pay liability. Under section 706(g), a court may 
enjoin both the employer and the union from enforcing the term and yet hold the employer 
solely liable for back pay. The second argument assumes that a strict liability rule would 
increase bargaining resistance in all cases. But see text at notes 87-92 i'!fra. The Harvard Note 
reluctantly admits that under its proffered "results" test a union is expected to make unlimited 
economic sacrifice to achieve a nondiscriminatory contract. The Note apparently prefers such 
an unrealistic expectation to what it concludes would be the impossible task under an "efforts 
test" of prescribing "the economic value which a union should place on negotiating a non-
discriminatory contract." Id at 706 n.24. The present Note argues that such an inquiry is not 
impossible. Under the rule suggested here, courts would not have to price the value of work-
ers' rights in a speculative market of human dignity; they would merely inquire whether or not 
back pay would deter discrimination in similar cases. 
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have to surrender (or the costs it will have to bear)81 to bargain away 
a discriminatory term exceed its expected contribution liability,82 
that party will cease bargaining against the discriminatory term. In 
other words, the "bargaining resistance" inspired by contribution is 
limited by the potential contribution liability, and the resistance dis-
sipates once the party desiring the discriminatory term offers benefits 
(or imposes costs) in return for the term that exceed the other party's 
expected contribution share. This limit to rational bargaining resist-
ance suggests that deterrence might be increased by barring contri-
bution claims against a party that had bargained against a 
discriminatory term until it received a benefit that exceeded its po-
tential liability.83 Allowing contribution in such a case would not 
alter the bargaining behavior of similarly situated parties - they 
would continue to prefer title VII liability to the costs of removing 
the discriminatory term. 
Two examples illustrate a bargaining-resistance "defense" to a 
81. A union might, for example, face an employers demand that the union accept lower 
wage scales in return for exclusion of the discriminatory term. Or, a majority of union mem-
bers might face the loss of benefits to be gained by minority members. In either case, the 
potential lost value may be termed the "bargaining cost" to the union of gaining a non-dis-
criminatory contract. The cost of a strike, in the event the parties reached impasse over the 
term, would also be a cost of removal, to be compared with potential liability costs. 
82. A party might actually compare bargaining costs with its expected contribution liabil-
ity as discounted by the likelihood of suit. Merely requiring a showing that bargaining costs 
exceeded undiscounted contribution liability costs would not produce bargaining by an amoral 
cost-efficient union at a level in excess of the discounted contribution liability costs. But the 
bargaining-resistance defense presented infra at notes 83-96 should nevertheless not be based 
on a party's assessment of discounted liability costs, for two reasons. 
The factual complexity of assessing the proper amount of discount would itself be a reason 
to set the threshold at the undiscounted level. Parties will have varying degrees of risk-aver-
sity. A small union, for instance, with limited self-insurance reserves, might fear a single large 
back pay judgment so much that it would pay bargaining costs approaching the full amount of 
potential liability costs, while a large union responsible for many different contracts, possessing 
large cash reserves, would tend to bargain only up to the level of discounted liability costs, 
especially where the potential liability costs were small. Because of this unpredictable varia-
tion, courts should simply presume that all unions will bargain at the undiscounted level. See 
generally, Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of 
Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. R.Ev. 419,468 (1980) (arguing that a strategy of punish-
ment for organizational criminal behavior should be designed to deter both risk-preferrers and 
risk-averters because "[t]here may be substantial numbers of both risk preferrers and risk 
averters in th[e] relevant pool of potential offenders"); see also Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penal-
ties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693, 705 (1973). 
Moreover, one must not assume that all unions will see the problem solely as a matter of 
avoiding liability. Some unions might evaluate the problem of bargaining against discrimina-
tion as a matter of total cost and benefit to the membership as a whole. Such a union would, to 
remove a discriminatory term, pay bargaining costs equal to the full undiscounted liability 
costs. If the defense's hurdle were lowered to the level of discounted liability costs, such 
"good" unions would be given an incentive to mioiroi:re the likelihood of employee suits by 
means of secrecy or misstatement. To avoid this unwanted incentive effect, the defense thresh-
old should be set at the level of undiscounted liability costs. 
83. At least one court of appeals has absolved a union that bargained persistently and 
vocally against the employers discriminatory term, but the court did not indicate why title VII 
permitted such a result. See Williams v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1975). 
For a similar EEOC result, see EEOC Decision No. 70112, 2 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 410 (1969). 
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contribution claim. 84 Consider first an employer who wants to make 
employees and outside applicants for a certain position take a test 
that a union believes to be discriminatory. During collective bar-
gaining, the employer may offer a union wage increases or fringe 
benefits in return for its acceptance of the discriminatory test. If the 
value of the benefits exceeds the amount the union expects it would 
pay in contribution claims, the union may accept the employer's of-
fer. 85 Imagine second that the employer offers no benefit in ex-
change for the union's acceptance of the test, but instead insists that 
the union must strike to excise the term it believes to be discrimina-
tory. 86 If the union believes that the costs of a strike exceed its po-
tential liability for contribution, it may choose to sign an agreement 
containing the offensive term. In these two cases, allowing contribu-
tion will not increase -deterrence. The question then becomes 
whether some other apportionment scheme might increase deter-
rence in these cases, and whether the costs of identifying these cases 
outweigh the additional deterrence that might result from creating 
an exception to a rule allowing contribution. 
Denying employer claims for contribution from unions87 that 
have bargained to the limit of their rational resistance would pro-
mote deterrence in three ways. First, employee plaintiffs may be less 
reluctant to bring title VII suits against employers if courts recognize 
84. Although this Note discusses the desirability of a bargaining-resistance defense to a 
contribution claim, the same reasoning might support a bargaining-resistance cause of action 
for indemnification. If a plaintiff sues an employer alone, and the employer sues a union for 
contribution, the bargaining-resistance defense comes into play. If a plaintiff sues both the 
employer and the union, and if the union would have had a bargaining-resistance defense to 
contribution had the employer alone been sued, the union should be able lo sue the employer 
for indemnification. 
85. If a union decided that the cost of bargaining away a discriminatory term exceeded the 
potential cost of back pay liability for the inclusion of the term, it might decide as a matter of 
economic prudence to incur liability rather than pay the bargaining costs. Even a union that 
took its minority members' rights seriously might make the same calculation in cost/benefit 
terms. The union's potential liability could be considered equal to the minority employees' 
lost benefits. If the cost to all employees of obtaining that benefit exceeded the value of the 
benefit, the union would have no reason to make the trade. 
86. An employer might insist upon a discriminatory term even when the term offered him 
a marginal benefit, if he wished to establish his credibility in later bargaining. See C. STE-
VENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION 86-87 (1963); N. CHAMBER· 
LAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 219 (1951). 
87. A resisting employer faced with union insistence on a discriminatory term might also 
be entitled to a bargaining-resistance defense in some cases. The employer in such cases occu-
pies an analogous position to a resisting union, but not an identical one. The concern that 
employees would be deterred from suing their union would not necessarily apply to the em-
ployer. As a practical matter, a union's inability to pay large back pay awards might cause 
jointly liable employers to pay a judgment regardless of contribution rules. Cf. Rios v. 
Steamfitters Local 638, 400 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing need to adjust title VII 
attorneys' fee award in light of union's being a relatively shallow-pocketed organization not 
operated for profit), qffd, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1976). Most of the 
arguments in this Note supporting a defense for the resisting union, however, support a de-
fense for the resisting employer as well. 
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a bargaining-resistance defense to contribution claims against un-
ions. If contribution is always allowed, union members may be re-
luctant to sue because they know that their union will be forced to 
contribute to any back pay award. The employee may be particu-
larly reluctant to sue where the union has bargained actively against 
the discriminatory term, but has accepted it because the employer 
demanded an unacceptably high price for its removal. The deterrent 
rationale for back pay remedies under title VII depends on the en-
couragement of private title VII actions;88 to the extent a universal 
contribution rule inhibits private suits, a bargaining-resistance de-
fense would enhance deterrence. 
Second, protecting a union with a bargaining-resistance defense 
might encourage it to bargain against a discriminatory term in cases 
where it would otherwise remain silent. If employers had a uniform 
right to contribution, a union desiring to excise a discriminatory 
term might decide that to try and fail is worse than never having 
tried at all. If the union were unsure that it could successfully nego-
tiate for the term's omission,89 it might prefer complete passivity be-
cause a vigorous attack on the term would publicize the existence of 
the term and increase the likelihood of employee suits.90 It might 
also conclude that if it did try to bargain against the term, it would 
risk trading away employee benefits without gaining a freedom from 
back pay liability.91 A bargaining-resistance defense would establish 
88. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). 
89. !fa union had perfect information about each party's utility and potential liability, and 
if each party were rational, then the union could always predict the outcome of negotiations 
for the removal of discriminatory terms. In the real world, however, imperfect information 
and stubborn parties make such prediction hazardous in many cases. See lecture by Maurice 
J. Tobin (May 16 and 18, 1949), reprinted in INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 76, 81-82 (C. Knight ed. 1950); text at note 41 supra. 
90. Cf. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 719 (1976) (discussing, in a slightly dif-
ferent context, the relatively high "level of visibility" ofa union's contract negotiation, making 
it subject to thorough review by the membership). 
91. See C. STEVENS, supra note 86, at 103-07. Professor Stevens observes that a party to 
collective bargaining faces "a rather delicate problem," id. at 105, in attempting to change an 
"ostensible position, with the intention of conveying information to one's opposite number 
about one's equilibrium position [the minimum bargaining point at which one is willing to 
conclude an agreement]," id.; J. DUNLOP & J. HEALY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRINCIPLES 
AND CASES 65 (rev. ed. 1953) (Despite the bargaining convention that all offers in a "package" 
proposal "are provisions and may be formally withdrawn if there is not settlement of the total 
dispute. . . . [o]ffers made are seldom effectively withdrawn, except when one side or the 
other has suffered serious defeat in a strike or lockout."). 
A union that has decided to remain passive during bargaining might attempt to minimize 
its losses by suing the employer over the discriminatory term as quickly as possible after sign-
ing the agreement, thereby reducing the period over which back pay would be calculated. See 
Comment, supra note 34, at 141 l. The union would not escape liability for its share of back 
pay by bringing such a suit. See Communications Workers of America v. New York Tel. Co., 
8 Emp. Prac. Dec. 5356 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (union improper class representative because union 
could itself face liability if contract term proved discriminatory). One author argues that the 
strict liability rule encourages union suits in this fashion. See Comment, supra note 34, at 
1412. But see Note, supra note 11, at 704 n.16. To the extent that allowing contribution en-
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a threshold of resistance beyond which a union would not have to 
go; the existence of this horizon would allow unions to bargain af-
firmatively without fearing that their resistance, if followed by fail-
ure, would be worse than no resistance at all. 
Finally, denying contribution in these cases would do more than 
encourage employees to sue and unions to resist; it would double the 
potential liability of employers who insist upon discriminatory 
terms. This doubling of potential liability might cause some employ-
ers to consider for the first time the value of a long established dis-
criminatory practice.92 It might also cause some employers to 
abandon terms that they would have desired if they were certain that 
unions would bear half of any back pay award. 
Allowing unions to assert a bargaining-resistance defense to em-
ployer contribution claims would therefore significantly increase title 
VII deterrence through its effects on employees, unions, and employ-
ers. It remains to establish a workable standard that district courts 
can apply in granting or denying a bargaining-resistance defense to 
contribution claims. Since the rationale behind the bargaining-
resistance defense rests upon deterrence, the standard should tum 
upon the deterrent effect of contribution. When a union asserts a 
bargaining-resistance defense to contribution, the district court 
should ask whether allowing contribution will in the future deter 
similarly situated unions from signing discriminatory collective bar-
gaining agreements. Contribution will not deter if the union's ex-
courages unions to sue over discriminatory terms, rather than negotiate their removal, it un-
dermines the policies of the statute. A plaintiff union in such a suit would be unlikely to 
provide the best possible challenge to alleged discrimination: 
[U]nions forced into the courtroom by fear of Title VII liability would be less than ideal 
advocates. Motivated solely by its desire to avoid liability, the union would have abso-
lutely no stake in the outcome of the ''test case." If the court invalidated the questionable 
provision, the threat of liability would be removed. If no Title VII violation were found, 
the union would likewise emerge "victorious." Regardless of the outcome, the union's 
sole objective - avoidance of liability - would be achieved. 
Comment, supra note 34, at 1412. Inexplicably, this Comment seems to assume that a union 
would be immune to back pay claims if it were a plaintiff. Plaintiff unions have no such 
immunity, for employers can file counterclaims for contribution. See cases cited at note 22 
supra. A union strategy of bargaining passivity followed by a quick suit undermines the goal 
of title VII to promote compliance with the statute at the bargaining table rather than in the 
courtroom. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975), 
92. The bargaining-resistance defense may encourage separate discussion of discrimina-
tory terms, thereby causing parties to assess carefully the value of discrimination. Cf. Al-
. bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (recommending that employers and 
unions examine and evaluate their employment practices). Without a bargaining-resistance 
defense, bargaining over the discriminatory term may become enmeshed with other issues in a 
"package deal," and the employer may never be forced to reevaluate the value of the practice 
to him. See C. STEVENS, supra note 86, at 44 (discussing the phenomenon of "package" settle-
ments of collective bargaining disagreements). Some troublesome terms may be settled by 
placing them in a package with other terms and reaching a "covert agreement" to include them 
in the final agreement without specific discussion of the troublesome terms. To parties reach-
ing such a package settlement, "it is the total cost of that package that matters," not the cost of 
individual items in the package. Id 
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pected liability falls short of the costs of bargaining away the 
discriminatory term. The court should therefore bar contribution 
where a union can show that it bargained against a discriminatory 
term and reasonably concluded that the costs of removing the term 
exceeded the potential back pay liability. 
This standard is, admittedly, difficult to apply. Each of the vari-
ables the court must balance - the potential liability93 and the costs 
of removing the term94 - defies precise measurement. And the stan-
dard requires courts to examine the machinations of collective bar-
gaining, a task some judges have found distasteful.95 Nevertheless, 
the standard has much to recommend it. Combined with joint and 
several liability and a general right to contribution, the bargaining-
resistance defense assures that back pay awards will effectively pro-
mote the compensatory and deterrent purposes of title VII. The 
standard also assures that experienced district judges will retain a 
limited, but desirable, measure of discretion in adjudicating title VII 
contribution claims.96 These advantages make it worthwhile for 
courts to assume the administrative burden incident to a bargaining 
resistance defense. The next section considers a final objection to the 
defense. 
C. Preserving the Incentive to Seek Relief Under Section 8(a)(5) 
Unions need not rely on bargaining alone to get rid of discrimi-
93. Potential back pay liability is speculative even at the time of suit. Courts will have to 
consider what the union reasonably believed to be the potential liability at the time of bargain-
ing. The time. period during which back pay is assessed is fairly certain during bargaining, 
however: it is the life of the contract or of the discriminatory provision, subject to the two-year 
limitation provided in section 706(g). See note 9 supra. 
94. These costs include the value of benefits the union received in return for accepting the 
discriminatory term and the costs of a strike (if necessary) to remove the term. Neither cost is 
easily measured. 
95. See generally Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
719-20 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting) (in determining whether the labor ex-
emption from the antitrust laws applies, "an attempted inquiry into the motives of employers 
or unions for entering into collective bargaining agreements on subjects of mandatory bargain-
ing is totally artificial"); R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at 561-62 (some courts reluctant to ex-
amine bargaining history as evidence of arbitrability as a disputed issue). But cf. id. at 339-41, 
where Professor Gorman discusses the necessary intrusion by the NLRB into the collective 
bargaining process when determining whether and when an economic strike is converted by an 
employer's bad-faith bargaining into an unfair labor practice strike: 
[p]articularly in a complex bargaining situation where many issues are discussed and 
many compromises necessary before an economic strike will be settled, it may be difficult 
to ascertain whether any one issue, economic or otherwise, is preventing settlement. In 
such instances, the Board must tum to such evidence of union motive as union telegrams, 
union newspaper advertisements, statements made at union meetings, and personal recol-
lections of collective bargaining sessions. 
96. See United Statc:s v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1060 (5th Cir. 1973) 
("The apportionment problem is initially one for the district judge ... "), cert. denied sub nom. 
United States Steel v. Ford, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 
F.2d 641,655 (5th Cir. 1974) ("apportionment of the responsibility for equitable relief in a case 
such as this one falls within the sound discretion of the district court"). 
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natory contract terms. Rather than bargain for the term's omission, 
a union can seek a determination that the term is illegal under sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.97 If the National 
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") decides that the term is illegal 
and that the employer has either insisted on it to the point of impasse 
or made it a condition of agreement, the Board may order the em-
ployer to withdraw the term and proceed with bargaining.98 Al-
though there is no general duty to file unfair labor practice charges, a 
union may be spurred to initiate a section 8(a)(5) proceeding by the 
fear of liability under title VII.99 Indeed, if section 8(a)(5) proceed-
ings were truly a cost-free and infallible means of excluding discrim-
inatory terms from collective bargaining agreements, unions would 
always resort to them rather than attempt to bargain away the illegal 
discriminatory term. A bargaining-resistance defense would be un-
desirable if section 8(a)(5) proceedings involved little cost because 
the defense might encourage unions to sign discriminatory agree-
ments that could easily have been challenged before the NLRB. 
Section 8(a)(5) proceedings, however, do entail significant costs 
for the union that initiates them. One such cost is the poisoned bar-
gaining atmosphere that may follow the union's resort to the NLRB. 
After the conclusion of the section 8(a)(5) proceedings, the employer 
might adopt a much tougher bargaining stance with regard to such 
mandatory subjects as wages and pension benefits. This would effec-
tively force the union to purchase the employees' title VII entitle-
ments at a substantial cost. However, in the procedural context in 
which this question would arise, the cost would be largely conjec-
tural.100 A second cost of section 8(a)(5) proceedings is delay: bar-
gaining on all issues may be suspended while the section 8(a)(5) 
charges are pending. If the NLRB eventually finds that the em-
ployer has violated section 8(a)(5), some retroactive relief may be 
possible, but the portion of the employees' lost wages in the form of 
delayed contractual benefits will not be recoverable. 101 Finally, the 
union risks that the NLRB will find the employer not to have vio-
97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 
98. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); R. GORMAN, 
supra note 90, at 498 (discussing Borg-Warner). 
99. If the cost of a section 8(a)(5) proceeding is greater than the potential liability, the 
rational union will forgo the section 8(a)(5) proceeding and suffer the consequences. If the cost 
of a section 8(a)(5) proceeding is less than the potential liability but exceeds the cost of bar-
gaining for the term's removal, the rational union will simply pay those bargaining costs. 
100. The issue will not arise unless the union has not filed a section 8(a)(5) complaint. 
Only during a subsequent lawsuit by the injured parties would the question arise of what the 
union would have lost in wages and benefits had it filed a section 8(a)(5) complaint. • 
IOI. Even where the employer has in fact refused to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5), 
the Supreme Court has held that the Board may not award the equivalent of forgone contrac-
tual benefits to the employees damaged by this refusal. The NLRA does not allow the Board 
to decide what terms the parties would have agreed to had the employer not refused to bar-
gain. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). 
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lated section 8(a)(5). 102 
Even if section 8(a)(5) proceedings cost nothing, some unions 
might forgo them for reasons unrelated to the availability of the bar-
gaining-resistance defense. Not all proposals that expose unions to 
title VII liability can be removed by resort to the NLRB during bar-
gaining. The employer violates section 8(a)(5) only if it insists on an 
illegal term to the point of impasse, or conditions agreement to 
mandatory terms on the union's agreement to the illegal proposal. 
By disguising its insistence on a discriminatory term as a mere pro-
posal, an employer with great bargaining power may be able to 
evade section 8(a)(5) liability, yet still secure agreement to the dis-
criminatory term. A weak union facing a powerful employer might 
therefore decide that a section 8(a)(5) complaint would be point-
less.103 
The bargaining-resistance defense only eliminates the incentive 
to file section 8(a)(5) actions when the union's bargaining costs ex-
ceed its potential back pay liability and the costs of the section 
8(a)(5) proceeding are less than its potential liability. In such a case, 
the union could eliminate the discriminatory term at a cost less than 
its potential liability by initiating section 8(a)(5) proceedings, yet it 
will choose to accept the discriminatory contract because that choice 
costs nothing. While it would be theoretically desirable to eliminate 
the bargaining-resistance defense where these inequalities hold, it 
would be hard to prove that a case falls within the exception. The 
costs of a poisoned bargaining atmosphere or of delay in bargaining, 
though potentially great, are inherently speculative. If the union 
were given the burden of proving that the costs of section 8(a)(5) 
proceedings exceeded its potential liability, it could rarely meet that 
burden, and the bargaining-resistance defense (and its added deter-
rence) would never be utilized. To avoid this undesirable result, 
courts should instead afford employers a chance to prove th~t unions 
102. The likelihood of NLRB error is another cause of delay. Title VII questions are com-
plex. See, e.g., Southwestern Pipe, Inc. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1971) (reversing 
NLRB findings that employer's proposal was illegal under title VII). Section 8(a)(5) actions 
would probably be the only context in which the NLRB would ever be called upon to decide 
title VII issues. The likelihood of NLRB error might encourage the losing party to seek appel-
late review by refusing to abide by the NLRB's order. See Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1947 § lO(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). 
103. See R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at 497-98. Professor Gorman criticizes the Supreme 
Court's distinction in the Borg-Warner case between permissive and mandatory terms; his 
observations are equally true of bargaining over illegal terms. The Borg-Warner rule, writes 
Gorman, 
makes the existence of an unfair labor practice turn upon the very nice distinction be-
tween proposing and insisting, a distinction that is foreign to the practicalities of collective 
bargaining . . . . [I]t is doubtful that it is practicable to forbid insistence on permissive 
(and, by extension, illegal] subjects, since a strong party at the bargaining table can realis-
tically do so without much fear of legal reprisal, if only by disguising its insistence as 
related to a mandatory subject (and then relenting on that insistence when the other party 
makes a concession on the truly desired permissive [or illegal] subject). 
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would have prevailed in section 8(a)(5) proceedings at a reasonable 
cost when unions assert a bargaining-resistance defense to contribu-
tion.104 If the employer fails to carry this burden, the courts should 
recognize the bargaining-resistance defense even though the union 
has failed to attack the discriminatory proposal through a section 
8(a)(5) proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts could fashion rules of back pay liability and apportion-
ment that would promote the compensatory and deterrent purposes 
of title VII. For a variety of reasons, they have failed to do so. This 
Note identifies the most desirable set of rules, a~d urges courts to 
adopt them: 1 
(1) Parties that sign a discriminatory collective bargaining 
agreement should be jointly and severally liable for back pay. 
(2) When a plaintiff sues only one party to a discriminatory 
agreement for back pay, the party should usually have a right to 
contribution from other signatories. 
(3) Contribution shares should be apportioned among the sig-
natories such that management and labor each bear one half of any 
back pay award. 
(4) Unions that have unsuccessfully resisted a discriminatory 
term during collective bargaining should be immune from contribu-
tion claims if the costs of removing the discriminatory term appeared 
to exceed their potential back pay liability. 
(5) An employer should be able to overcome this "bargaining-
resistance defense" to a contribution claim if it can prove that the 
union could have removed the term through section 8(a)(5) proceed-
ings at a ,cost below its potential back pay liability. 
104. Where the discriminatory term proposed by the employer was clearly -illegal under 
existing precedent (which reduces the likelihood of NLRB error) and the employer was rela• 
tively weak (which reduces both the likelihood that the employer could successfully disguise its 
insistence on the term as a mere proposal and that the employer would reduce employee bene-
fits punitively in the bargaining following the NLRB's order), the costs of section S(a)(S) pro-
ceedings probably would have been quite low, and contribution should probably be allowed. 
